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THE BARGAINING LOCKOUT-REINCARNATION
OF AN EQUALIZER
Recently, the Supreme Court held that an employer may lock out his
employees after a bargaining impasse has been reached for the sole purpose
of obtaining favorable contract terms.' Thus an old bargaining weapon
has been revitalized, sharpened and added to management's arsenal. Prior
to this decision two kinds of lockout had been generally recognized as
lawful. One was the economic lockout prompted by the threat of an
imminent strike which would cause extraordinary losses to an employer's
operations and product.2 The other was the lockout of employees of a
multi-employer bargaining association to protect the unity of the associa-
tion against "whipsawing," 8 i.e., selective strikes against individual mem-
bers of the association. 4
Until the decision in American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, lockouts
for the sole purpose of improving a bargaining position had been held
presumptively to violate sections 8(a) (1) 6 and 8(a) (3) 7 of the National
Labor Relations Act by interfering both with the union's right to bargain
collectively and with its right to strike." But the Supreme Court in
American Ship rejected both branches of this line of reasoning. Conclud-
ing that a bargaining lockout does not presumptively violate any section
8(a) (1) protection of the union's right to strike, the Court said that the
union has the right to cease work, but not the right to determine the time
of the work stoppage. Thus the union's argument that it had nothing left
to strike against was deemed futile.9 The Court also held that the bar-
gaining lockout is not so destructive of collective bargaining or of the
union's ability to represent its members effectively as to constitute a prima
'American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300 (1965).
2 Packard Bell Electronics Corp., 130 N.L.R.B. 1122 (1961) ; Betts Cadillac Olds,
Inc., 96 N.L.R.B. 268 (1951); Duluth Bottling Ass'n, 48 N.L.R.B. 1335 (1943).
3 See NLRB v. Truck Drivers Union, 353 U.S. 87 (1957).
4 See NLRB v. Brown, 319 F.2d 7, 9 n.3 (10th Cir. 1963).
5380 U.S. 300 (1965).
6 "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer--(1) to interfere with,
restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7."
49 Stat. 452 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1) (1964).
7 "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer-(3) by discrimination in
regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to
encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization ... " 49 Stat 452
(1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (3) (1964).
s See Quaker State Oil Ref. Corp. v. NLRB, 270 F.2d 40 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
361 U.S. 917 (1959).
9 American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 310 (1965).
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fade violation of section 8(a) (1). In addition, the Court determined that
a bargaining lockout does not necessarily violate section 8(a) (3). A viola-
tion of this section, the Court observed,10 normally turns on finding both
that the employer, motivated by an anti-union animus, discriminated against
members of the union and that the discrimination resulted in discourage-
ment of union membership. The Court said that to find a bargaining
lockout in violation of section 8(a) (3), the employer must be motivated
by an unlawful purpose.:"
In American Ship the Court also rejected any Board authority to ban
bargaining lockouts by balancing bargaining weapons and determining what
weapons management and labor would be allowed to use.'2 This result
seems reasonable since even if the Board possessed such balancing power,
the bargaining lockout does not weight the scales so heavily in favor of
management that it should prima facie constitute an unfair labor practice.
Arguments to the contrary are usually based on the theory that management
has other available alternatives,' 3 which are declared to be its right to
replace strikers 14 and its right to institute limited unilateral changes after
a bargaining impasse has been reached 15 in such areas as employment
conditions, wages and hours.'
But neither of these alternatives is in fact effective. As Professor
Meltzer has pointed out, the right to replace tends to be more academic
than real. Replacement often produces bitterness, if not bloodshed, and
the use of ill-trained substitutes at the time of union picketing and boy-
cotting severely limits the effectiveness of the replacement power.
17
Similarly, the right to make limited unilateral changes after an impasse
is largely worthless unless in taking that action the employer holds back
something with which to bargain. If he unilaterally institutes all of the
program he is currently offering to the union, he may have nothing left
to trade in exchange for union concessions, and the union will expect more
in return for agreeing to contract terms. But holding back any part of
the program prejudices him with both his employees and the public, making
1o Employer activity can be so inherently prejudicial to the union's protected
rights as to present overwhelming evidence of an unlawful motive. See NLRB v.
Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 228 (1963).
"1380 U.S. at 313 (dictum). The Board no longer presses the contention that a
bargaining lockout violates section 8(a) (5). If the employer continues to bargain
with the union during the lockout, no violation of this section should be found. See
49 Stat. 453 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (5) (1964).
12 380 U.S. at 315.
13 See Davis Furniture Co., 100 N.L.R.B. 1016, 1020-21 (1952), reV'd sub nomz.
Leonard v. NLRB, 205 F.2d 355 (9th Cir. 1953); Morand Bros. Beverage Co., 99
N.L.R.B. 1448, 1465 (1952).
14 NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
15An impasse is required before an employer can institute unilateral changes,
because changes prior to impasse are thought to undermine the union's status as a
bargaining representative. See NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 741-42 (1962).
11 See NLRB v. Tex-Tan, Inc., 318 F.2d 472, 479-82 (5th Cir. 1963).
17 See Meltzer, Single-employer and Multi-employer Lockouts Under the Taft-
Hartley Act, 24 U. Cia. L. REv. 70, 79 (1956). Replacement power as a comple-
ment to a lawful bargaining lockout, however, may be effective. See note 19 infra.
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him appear less willing to compromise than he really is.18 In the hostile
atmosphere of a labor dispute, an employer who refuses to institute condi-
tions which even he is willing to concede in return for a contract will
probably lose more by creating additional antagonisms than he will gain by
undermining the union's program. Since in reality management has few
effective devices to counteract the protected power of labor, it seems fair
that the bargaining lockout should not presumptively constitute an unfair
labor practice.
In any case the Court has established the lawfulness of the bargaining
lockout, and it is the impact of that decision that is now important. Much
of that impact will turn, not on the questions the Court resolved, but on the
answers to the questions the Court left unresolved: whether an impasse
will be required before a lockout will be held lawful and whether an em-
ployer will be able to replace, either permanently or temporarily, his locked
out employees.19
In American Ship the Court was dealing with a situation in which an
impasse had occurred,2 0 and consequently framed its rule in terms of an
impasse. But it is unlikely that the Court meant that an impasse was
requisite to a lawful lockout. An impasse requirement could be imposed
to affect either the subject matter of bargaining or the time after which a
lockout could lawfully be employed. Since the Court could not have been
concerned with protecting bargaining over nonmandatory subjects, 21 any
impasse requirement would have to be designed to prevent a lockout prior
in time to a stalemate. Insofar as the Court was trying to protect the
bargaining process as a whole, an impasse requirement would be mere
surplusage, in light of section 8(a) (5)'s demand for good faith bar-
gaining.2 2 If an employer laid off his employees immediately upon receipt
of the union's demands, for example, a strong inference of bad faith would
arise,23 and it would be unnecessary to reach the question whether an impasse
18 Meltzer, supra note 17, at 79.
19 Compare American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 308 n.8 (1965),
with id. at 324 (White, J., concurring). Replacement as a complement to a lawful
lockout does not suffer from all the infirmities discussed at text accompanying note
17 supra, relating to the use of that power during a strike. Management, being able
to time the work stoppage, can make better plans to obtain qualified replacements
such as workers seasonally unemployed in other industries.
20 American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 303 (1965).
21 If an impasse requirement were imposed, it would only be to protect bargaining
over mandatory items-"vages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment."
49 Stat. 452 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1964). Other items have no
statutory protection in that management or labor can refuse to bargain about them.
Local 164, Brotherhood of Painters v. NLRB, 293 F.2d 133 (D.C. Cir. 1961). A lock-
out over these nonmandatory ones, however, would be strong evidence of bad faith
bargaining, and an employer refusal to continue to bargain during the lockout would
be considered a refusal to bargain as to mandatory items, and thus a violation of
section 8(a) (5). Cf. NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342,
349 (1958).
249 Stat 452 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (5) (1964); NLRB v.
Insurance Agents' Union, 361 U.S. 477 (1960).
2 3 Arlington-Fairfax Broadcasting Co., 95 N.L.R.B. 846 (1951), aff'd per curian,
204 F.2d 128 (4th Cir. 1953) ; see Great Southern Trucking Co. v. NLRB, 127 F.2d
180, 185 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 652 (1942).
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had occurred. In fact, the finding that an impasse has been reached may
be the same as a finding that the employer has bargained in good faith.
It may therefore be a practical impossibility to litigate the one as distin-
guished from the other.
Whatever other purposes an impasse requirement might serve, neither
the reasoning of the Court in American Ship nor the rationale behind use
of the requirement in other situations supports its imposition as to bargain-
ing lockouts.
The Court's reasoning in support of the legitimacy of the bargaining
lockout after an impasse 24 is equally applicable to lockouts prior to impasse.
In fact, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has held that an em-
ployer does not prima facie violate the act by employing a bargaining lock-
out prior to an impasse.25 The court of appeals said: "While in American
Ship Building there was an impasse in the negotiations between the em-
ployer and the union, we do not think the teaching of that case merely
adds another exception to the Board's category of permissible lockouts." 26
The Supreme Court has required that an impasse 27 in bargaining be
reached before management may lawfully make limited unilateral changes
in wages, hours, or employment conditions. 2 8 The impasse requirement as
a prerequisite to these changes is, however, understandable. If manage-
ment were permitted to institute favorable changes prior to a stalemate, it
could successfully undermine the union's status as a bargaining repre-
sentative.2 9 No such effect would follow from holding lawful bargaining
lockouts prior to an impasse. In order to avoid violating section 8(a) (5) ,3
an employer would have to continue to bargain to an impasse during the
lockout. The real advantage that would inure to management would be its
ability to determine the time of the work stoppage-an advantage clearly
lawful under American Ship.
8 1
The institution of permanent or temporary replacements presents two
related yet distinct factual situations. The hiring of temporary replace-
ments as a complement to a bargaining lockout should not be held a
prima facie violation of the act. It does not increase interference with the
union s right to represent its members, its right to bargain for contract
terms, or its right to strike over that which results from the lawful bargain-
ing lockout itself. Moreover, the temporary replacement of locked out em-
24 See text accompanying notes 9-11 supra.
2 Detroit Newspaper Publishers Ass'n v. NLRB, 346 F.2d 527 (6th Cir. 1965).
26 Id. at 530. This conclusion is compelled by the reasoning in American; Ship.
This is particularly true as to a union's right to collective bargaining. Allowing the
employer to lock out prior to an impasse would not reduce his obligation to continue
to bargain in good faith with the employees' certified representative.
27 See p. 368 supra.
28 See NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 741-42 (1962).
29 Ibid.
3049 Stat. 453 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (5) (1964).
81 See 380 U.S. at 310.
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ployees is not such clear evidence of anti-union motivation as to constitute
a per se violation of section 8(a) (3).32 Although hiring of replacements
makes the bargaining lockout a more effective weapon and may severely
damage labor's bargaining position, subsequent actions to make a lawful
lockout effective do not prima facie constitute an unfair labor practice.
33
Management has two major legitimate interests during a labor dispute:
gaining favorable contract terms and maintaining efficient operations. To
outlaw the hiring of temporary replacements would require taking the seem-
ingly untenable position that those bargaining lockouts which impose great
burdens on management are lawful, while those which inflict only minimal
loss, although otherwise lawful, are unlawful. Since the hiring of tem-
porary replacements as a complement to a legitimate bargaining lockout
no more violates the act than does the bargaining lockout itself, and since
management should be allowed to protect its legitimate interest in main-
taining operations,34 the institution of temporary replacements should not
prima fade constitute an unfair labor practice.
Permanent replacement presents a different problem; 35 if the practice
were permitted, employers would be able not only to time any work
stoppage for maximum advantage, but also to deprive involuntarily idle
employees of their jobs. It is true that in an analogous situation-the
strike-an employer can permanently replace striking employees on the
theory that management has the right to maintain operations. 8 6 This
theory, combined with management's right to try to make a lawful lockout
effective 3 7 and the established lawfulness of the bargaining lockout,38
leads to the conclusion that the hiring of permanent replacements should
not prima facie violate the act. Per se rules should apply only to cases
where an activity "carries with it an inference of unlawful intention so
compelling that it is justifiable to disbelieve the employer's protestations
of innocent purpose." -9 The hiring of permanent replacements is not such
a case. Some employers will be unable to obtain qualified replacements to
continue operation without making the positions permanent.40 Although
32 Id. at 308, 311.
33 NLRB v. Great Falls Employers' Council, Inc., 277 F.2d 772 (9th Cir. 1960)
(members of multi-employer bargaining association allowed their locked out employees
to return to work once a week to disqualify them from collecting unemployment
compensation).
34 See NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333, 345 (1938).
35 Compare NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 292 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concur-
ring), with id. at 294 (White, J., dissenting).
36 NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
37 NLRB v. Great Falls Employer's Council, Inc., 277 F.2d 772 (9th Cir. 1960).
38 See American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300 (1965).
39 Id. at 311-12.
4 0 Furthermore, an employer who locks out highly skilled employees must go
to great expense to train replacements. If he must discharge the replacements upon
the locked out employees' return, the training expense will go to waste. In such
circumstances, the hiring of permanent replacements should not be a prima facie
violation of the act.
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the hiring of permanent replacements should be strong evidence of a sec-
tion 8(a) (3) violation, it should not be conclusive. The Board and the
courts should look to the employer's motivation in hiring the replacements
before finding an unfair labor practice. They should look to the surround-
ing circumstances: the availability of temporary help, the cost of training,
and similar considerations. There should be no more difficulty applying
this motivation test than there has been in finding many 8 (a) (3) violations.
